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BOOK COMMENT
THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, Albert J. Reiss, Jr. New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1971. Pp. xv, 228. $7.95.
The "revolution" in criminal rights since Mapp v. Ohio' has
produced considerable comment concerning the proper role of the
police. The Police and the Public is a contribution to this literature
by Yale sociologist Albert Reiss, Jr. Written primarily from a soci-
ological perspective, the book is based in part on empirical data col-
lected by Professor Reiss and his staff during their study of several
urban police departments from 1962 to 1968.
Although the book speaks only tangentially to the constitutional
standards that control police operations, this hardly means that soci-
ological study is not relevant to an evaluation of legal rules. Law-
yers and judges presumably are trained to deal with legal logic and
precedent, but they are much less able to assess the actual effect a
given rule has on individual and group behavior. Sociological data
and study may be useful in determining whether the definition of
constitutionally permissible police conduct rests on realistic assump-
tions with respect to efficient and socially useful police operation.
Furthermore, sociological inquiry may resolve the question of whether
rules which are aimed at producing a given type of police conduct
are in fact efficacious.
The behavioral scientist performs a useful role in gathering and
interpreting empirical data, and it is essential that lawyers recognize
that legal rules should, where possible, be based on behavioral data,
not merely on assumptions regarding conduct.2 Some of the data
which Professor Reiss has gathered and interpreted is of undeniable
relevance to attorneys, but many of his conclusions about rules of
law and the operation of the criminal justice system are poorly sup-
ported and difficult to accept. It is useful to consider, in evaluating
this book, to what extent the end product might have been substan-
tially improved had it resulted from an interdisciplinary undertak-
ing, with attorneys and behavioral scientists equally involved.
One general consideration relevant to the determination of con-
stitutional rules is the societal utility of a given type of government
action. Terry v. Ohio,3 for example, rests in part on the proposition
1367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 See, e.g., Note, The Effect of Jury Size on the Probability of Conviction: An
Evaluation of Williams v. Florida, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 529 (1971).
3392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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that field investigation and interrogation is an essential part of po-
lice work because of its utility in crime prevention.4 Empirical data
is certainly germane in determining to what extent police-instituted
field investigation is actually necessary.
The Police and the Public concludes that the police are most ef-
fident when serving a reactive rather than a proactive function;
that is, they are more efficient when responding to citizen calls than
when initiating intervention.5 For example, figures covering the
operation of a New Orleans tactical unit and canine corps show
that these divisions "reported 47,834 stops of citizens of whom
25,230 were frisked, resulting in a frisk rate of 53 percent and an
arrest rate of 17 percent. The 25,230 frisks yielded only 113 weap-
ons, creating a weapons-productivity rate of less than half of 1 per-
cent."8
Apparently the police practice in New Orleans was to allow frisks
even if the officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that
he had stopped an armed individual.7 This practice created even
greater inefficiency than was found in cities where constitutional
rules were more closely followed.8 Because these rules are based
on the probability that police will find what they are looking for,
this finding is hardly surprising.' More important, these statistics
4Ad. at 22-23.
5 A. REISS, THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 100-02, (1971) [hereinafter cited
as REISS]. In some situations, the law has, although perhaps only unconsciously,
legitimatized reactive police work more than proactive police work. For example,
when the police utilize an undisclosed informer, who arguably is part of the police
structure, the intervention is more proactive than reactive. Cf. id. at 87, discussing the
informer who is not only undisclosed but also anonymous to the police. The police
must support this informer's reliability, although it is not altogether dear at present
how much proof is necessary. Compare United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971)
with Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). But the same is not true when
the police derive probable cause from a named citizen who provides information, the
assumption in the latter case being that the disclosed citizen-informer is reliable and
acting wholly out of a sense of social duty, or because he himself has been victimized.
See United States v. Bell, 457"F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1971); Brown v. United States, 365
F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Decisions of this type are not based on any articulated
preference for reactive police work, but rather on a mistrust of the typical anonymous
informer, whom the courts perceive to be more a part of the criminal underworld than
the police structure. See In re Boykin, 39 Ill. 2d 617, 237 N.E.2d 460 (1968). But
cf. United States v. Harris, supra. Nevertheless, it is probably safe to conclude that
courts will be less suspicious of police conduct when it is motivated by a neutral citizen.
0 REISS at 92. These figures cover the period from April 15 to December 31, 1967.
7d. at 93-94.
8id.
9 Probable cause has been defined as "the facts and circumstances within [the
knowledge of the police) and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information suf-
ficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense
has been committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). "Reasonable
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indicate that rules confining police intervention to those situations
in which there is at least some degree of articulable probability do
not restrict efficient police operation. On the contrary, it would
seem that probable cause or reasonable suspicion rules may simply
be saving the police from an enormous number of useless and un-
profitable encounters.
Moreover, if proactive police work is generally inefficient, as The
Police and the Public concludes, it is questionable whether the lati-
tude given to the police by Terry to stop and frisk citizens with
less than the traditional requirement of probable cause makes sense.'0
If the police are largely inefficient when behaving proactively, why
should a constitutional rule, supposedly created by balancing the
need for effective police work against the attendant invasion of citi-
zen privacy,1 allow police invasions on less than the usual require-
ment of probable cause? An arguable alternative would limit the
police stop and frisk power to those situations in which police are
investigating a crime that has been committed and presumably re-
ported, thus deemphasizing statistically futile attempts to prevent as
yet uncommitted crimes by police investigation of "suspicious" be-
havior.12  Terry itself does deal with successful preventive police
work," but if success in that one case was statistically fortuitous, it
should not form the basis of a general rule of law.'4
suspicion," the standard for stop and frisk utilized in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
requires less than probable cause, but still depends on the presence of some identifiable
facts. See note 13 infra.
10 Once the stop is made, the frisk becomes necessary to protect the police officer.
This does not answer the question whether the officer should be authorized to make the
initial stop; if the frisk is valid, it must be because the stop is a proper exercise of police
authority. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
" Id. at 22-27. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
12 The recently promulgated ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE
FUNCTION (Tent. Draft. 1972) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS] concludes that the
police have a "limited capacity ... to perform in a preventive role. ... Id. at 57.
Nonetheless, the mere presence of police may promote a feeling of citizen security. Id.
at 68-69. The latter function is adequately fulfilled if the police are highly visible; it
does not require the kind of intervention envisioned by the stop and frisk cases.
13 In Terry a plain clothes detective observed two individuals on a downtown street
corner in mid-afternoon. One walked up and down, peering into a store window, and
then returned to his companion. The other individual then walked by the store, peered
into the window and also returned. This sequence was repeated about a dozen times.
The two suspects then talked to a third individual; about ten minutes after he had left,
they followed him down the street. Believing that an armed robbery was soon to take
place, the detective confronted the suspects, directed them inside the store, frisked them,
and found weapons in their possession. Since the feared robbery never took place, and
because there was no definite evidence that it in fact had been planned, the only charges
that could be brought were weapons code violations.
14 Although we expect a court, as a jurisprudential matter, to decide only the case
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Another dimension of the problem is illustrated by data which
indicate that police are put in greater physical jeopardy in proactive
situations; that is, an officer is more likely to sustain injury in a situ-
ation where he chooses to intervene, than he is in a situation where
he has been reactively dispatched.' This hypothesis seems consis-
tent with Reiss' view that citizen resistence is essentially a response
to the perceived arbitrariness of police intervention.' 6
Professor Reiss concludes from this data that it is the "illegiti-
macy" of the assertion of police authority that creates the danger to
the officer.' 7  In most cases, however, citizens cannot know whether
an officer's intervention conforms to technical legal standards. The
constitutional legitimacy of police intervention depends upon in-
formation known to the police. As a result, citizens are in a poor
position to judge whether police conduct is legal. Citizens may per-
ceive as illegitimate what is in fact legal, and the real question is to
what extent the law should allow and encourage police conduct
particularly likely to give rise to adverse citizen reaction. Al-
though the empirical evidence is not clear or persuasive on this
point,'8 it should at least be considered whether the law should af-
firmatively encourage police conduct that is not particularly efficient
and is at the same time likely to increase the risk to the policeman
(and presumably to citizens as well). More precisely, should Terry
before it, the Supreme Court has occasionally deviated from a strict case-by-case decisional
system and relied upon generalized behavioral and statistical data. See, e.g., Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (discussion of police practices recommended in police
manuals, but not used in the cases being decided); Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (studies of psychological effect of school segregation).
15 REIss at 60-62. Thus, although the stop may be less useful and justifiable in
situations where intervention is police-motivated, the danger to the officer may be greater.
See also note 10 supra.
16 REiss at 56-60.
17M. at 62.
18 For example, there is some indication that citizen reaction against police inter-
vention occurs in arrests for minor offenses:
First, arrests for minor violations are more likely to provoke citizens to claim
that authority is being exercised arbitrarily and unjustly, because many others
escape arrest in such situations. Facts may be more controversial in such sit-
uations, particularly as revealed by complainants or when there is disagree-
ment between a complainant and an alleged offender. Furthermore, bystanders
are more likely to interfere for precisely the same reasons, a judgment or
feeling that the officer is making an "arbitrary arrest," an arrest on grounds
about the persons, rather than the facts related to the offense; grounds of race
or class position, or other matters relating to the status of the offenders. In-
deed, often these bystanders are not "offended" by such conduct; they are
culpable. Id. at 57 (emphasis in original).
This data indicates to some unclear extent that citizen reactions against the police are
based on displeasure with substantive rules of law as well as opposition to police pro-
cedure, or perhaps more accurately, that substance and procedure are interrelated.
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have expanded the proper exercise of this type of activity by per-
mitting police intervention on less than traditional probable cause?
The data offered by The Police and the Public is hardly conclusive, 9
and it is clear that the utility of police patrol in crime prevention
needs further study by lawyers and behavioral scientists.2"
After attempting to establish what police do, and how they oper-
ate most effectively, Professor Reiss considers the forces which mo-
tivate police conduct and misconduct. His findings place in question
the effectiveness of existing legal mechanisms for controlling police
conduct. Presently, attempts are made to control police behavior
through judge-made rules defining, for example, the permissible
limits of interrogation and search and seizure. These rules are en-
forced by excluding from any subsequent criminal trial evidence un-
lawfully obtained by police if the person subjected to the illegal po-
lice action is in fact brought to trial.2 But despite the exclusionary
rule, police misconduct continues to be a problem. The New Or-
leans police stop and frisk procedure22 indicates that a police depart-
ment can make the strategic decision to violate constitutional rules,
free from any significant external penalty. If evidence is found, it
may not be used in a subsequent prosecution; but if the police are
interested in prevention, not prosecution, the exclusionary rule has
limited impact.23  The exclusionary rule is imperfect at best, and
there is considerable feeling that it should be replaced or supple-
mented.24 But the implications of The Police and the Public go
even further and suggest that the exclusionary rule may be- counter-
productive - its mere existence may increase police misconduct.
Professor Reiss' basic thesis is that more "civil" police behavior
can be achieved through increased professionalization of the police.
Because most professional groups are primarily responsible for set-
ting and monitoring their own standards, external review of police
practices, through judicial exclusion of evidence, is inconsistent with
the professional model. 25  An important difference, however, de-
19 The data has been gathered, unfortunately, without regard to any legal question
involving stop and frisk.
2 0 See STANDARDS at 56-67.
2 1 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 See notes 6-8 supra & accompanying text.
23 See STANDARDS at 157.
24 See, e.g., id. at 158.
25 REISS at 126-28. Professor Reiss points out that external control is exerted to
some extent in all professional situations, but that "the traditional professions have
tried to retain virtually complete control of standards of practice, arguing essentially
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tracting from the force of Reiss' analysis, is that the typical "client"
of a professional does not have interests that are in conflict with
those of the professional. The "client" of the police, however, has
been subjected to police action which has either thrust him into the
criminal justice system, put him under investigation, or somehow
limited his conduct. The citizens with whom the police have the
most direct contact, those analogous to the attorney's clients or the
doctor's patients, generally have concerns antagonistic to those of
the police.
Typically, a profession will be anxious to create and enforce
standards of conduct for its members to make the profession attrac-
tive to potential clients. In a situation where client interests are
different from the interests of the profession, it is unrealistic to ex-
pect the same impartial internal control. As a result, a more per-
vasive, neutral, external review system is required. Arguably, in-
creased "professionalization," in part through added emphasis on in-
ternal review, will reduce police misconduct; but will it reduce it
enough to obviate the conflict of interest problem or the need for ex-
ternal review in general? In dealing with citizen liberties, it seems
dangerous to emphasize internal review before misconduct has been
reduced.28
Regardless of whether external control over the police is desir-
able, its mere existence may in fact have a substantial effect on police
behavior. Professor Reiss characterizes the role distinctions among
attorneys, courts, and the police as conflicts among subsystems within
the criminal justice system:" External control may motivate retalia-
tory police behavior against the other subsystems. One obvious ex-
ample is police harassment of citizens. In Professor Reiss' opinion:
Counterstrategies necessarily emerge to limit the control exer-
cised by another subsystem. A major technique is to withhold in-
formation or output. Withholding information is particularly
effective when there are restrictions on organizational capacity to
develop information. The police can effectively control prose-
that members of a profession are the most qualified to judge the competence of ether
members." Id. at 127.
2 6 Whether "professior.alization" is a useful goal is itself open to question. Exactly
what "professionalization" means is not very clear. STANDARDS at 197. Furthermore,
professionalization comprehends increased discretion. But it has been suggested that
adequate protection of citizen rights from police abuse can be achieved only if police
discretion is limited by the promulgation of precise administrative guidelines and regu-
lations controlling police action vis-4-vis citizens. See Amsterdam, The Supreme Court
and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U.L REV. 785, 813-14 (1970).
In addition, the increased acceptance of police unionization, see, e.g., STANn ARDS at
170-71, is not necessarily consistent with a professional model.
27 REiss at 117.
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cutors in this way, since most prosecutors have little organizational
capacity to develop information. Withholding output obviates the
necessity to play according to the others' rules. For example, the
police need only conform to the rules of prosecutors and judges on
matters it sends to them, but not in those matters it handles by
internal means such as harassment by refusal to arrest or book, or
failure to request prosecution, thereby dropping charges.28
Succinctly stated, exclusion of evidence at trial has little preven-
tive effect if the police have no interest in prosecution. This con-
clusion - that police harassment which does not aim at prosecu-
tion cannot be stopped by the exclusionary rule - is hardly novel.
The most obvious response is to develop a mechanism by which the
judicial subsystem can react to prevent this type of police miscon-
duct.29 But the implications of Professor Reiss' conclusion go fur-
ther: he indicates that the mere existence of external control by the
judicial subsystem motivates police misconduct of a type which the
courts have difficulty in controlling.
To the extent that this is true, any type of judicial supervision
will be futile, since the police will presumably continue to seek ways
to avoid external control. What is not clear, however, is why it
is necessarily true that police harassment, with no aim at prosecu-
tion, is a reaction to judicial supervision of police conduct. Was
police harassment any less prevalent before Mapp was decided, when
the courts presumably were scrutinizing police conduct less close-
ly ?3o Data correlating an increase in judicial scrutiny of police con-
duct through evidentiary exclusion with an increase in police harass-
ment not reachable by judicial controls seems necessary to estab-
lish that the police are reacting against the judicial subsystem.
Harassment certainly may be, as Professor Reiss later points out,
281d. at 119.
29 See, e.g., Chief Justice Burger's suggestion that a damage remedy be established
by statute. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 421-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). A remedy such as this, if
it works, arguably would permit the discarding of the exclusionary rule. Until now,
however, it has not been shown that there is or can be a viable alternative remedy.
See also note 49 infra & accompanying text.
80 Although the exclusionary rule has been applied against the federal government
for nearly 50 years, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), it was not constitu-
tionally applied in state prosecutions until Mapp. Thus the typical police department,
making arrests usually leading to state prosecutions, could violate constitutional rights
without attendant evidentiary exclusions, except where police action was shocking to
the conscience of the court, See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). But as
the Mapp opinion pointed out, when Mapp was decided, more than half of the states
passing on the question had wholly or partially adopted an exclusionary rule. 367
U.S. at 651. In those states, the relevant inquiry thus is whether police harrassment
without prosecution increased after the state courts adopted the exclusionary rule.
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a police reaction to what the police perceive as their own inability to
get "justice" through proper channels because the other subsystems
reject their efforts and fail to show proper deference to the officers.31
But this may be a result of the policeman's belief that the criminal
justice system is unable to deal with groups of people whom the
officer feels should be punished rather than a reflection of police dis-
like of search and seizure restrictions.32  Police harassment and mis-
conduct directed against minority groups whom the police perceive
as "bad" but not properly controlled through the legal system cer-
tainly predates the period of intense judicial supervision of police
procedures.
Police misconduct most frequently takes the form of illegal
searches and frisks. 33 And while searches and frisks can be used to
harass, they frequently have a distinct prosecutorial aim. Professor
Reiss' data indicates that police use of force and threats is less prev-
alent than illegal searches and frisks.3' But if the police consciously
react against judicial restrictions on their conduct, exactly the op-
posite behavior pattern would be expected; the police should be
anxious to avoid conflicts with the courts. Threats and force can
be effective in preventing crime without the need for prosecution.
Searches and frisks, on the other hand, are only truly intimidating
to citizens when prosecution for possession of illegal goods is likely
to follow.
The second example Professor Reiss gives of police reaction
against other subsystems is also of questionable validity. He states
that:
Another common technique is to overload the next level. The
police may do this by mass arrest, as often happens when there are
issues over the policing of deviants. Overload of the system by
mass arrest may be particularly troublesome to the prosecutor and
the courts, as recent experience with urban riots and student dis-
sent eloquently testify.3 5
It is obvious that "overload" will cause problems for courts and
prosecutors. It does not, however, follow that overload reflects a
conscious attempt by the police to retaliate against prosecutors and
the courts. In the mass demonstration situation, the overload is
31 REiss at 138-40.
32 Cf. id. at 138-39, discussing citizen vigilante control over homosexuals.
33 Id. at 142.
34 Id. Force and threats are, however, more frequently reported by citizens. Id.
at 153-54.
35M. at 119-20.
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more likely caused by police perception of a need to terminate the
disruptive activity by physically controlling the demonstrators and
clearing the area,36 a view probably endorsed by the prosecutor's of-
fice. The fact that charges later may be dropped, or that cases later
may be dismissed, 31 is irrelevant to controlling the demonstration.
Professor Reiss also appears to consider plea bargaining a sub-
stantial factor in subsystem conflict. For example, he suggests that
subsystem conflict creates barriers to cooperation and communica-
tion, exemplified by prosecutor "back-room and hallway-plea bar-
gaining" and secret police interrogation.3 8 This suggestion assumes,
however, that the aims of the police and prosecutorial subsystems,
as related to both plea bargaining and interrogation, are different.
In fact, interrogation and the confessions procured thereby more
likely results in alliance between police and prosecutor against the
judicial subsystem. As far as plea bargaining is concerned, the po-
lice are at odds with the prosecutor only when the prosecutor is
"bargaining away" convictions for some prosecutorial gain from
which the police derive no benefit. The plea bargain is a compro-
mise between the defendant and the system as a whole, which may
save prosecutors, police, and courts considerable time and expense.
Furthermore, it is probably inaccurate to assume that no commu-
nication exists between the police and prosecutorial subsystems. This
assumption also appears in Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,39
in which he suggests that the exclusionary rule works only against
the prosecutor, since the police gain no real educational benefit
from judicial opinions declaring police procedures illegal. But the
police do communicate with the prosecutor's office and the prosecu-
tor's office may on its own initiative attempt to educate the police
as to the legality of police procedures.4 0  The ultimate goal of police
36 See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. ON CML DIsORDERS, 339
(1968).
37Id. at 339-40. Unfortunately, serious crimes may go unpunished as a result. Id.
3 8 Miss at 120.
89403 U.S. 388, 421-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4 0 This writer was an assistant district attorney in Philadelphia in 1970-7 1. In that
city, the police, on both an individual and formal basis, communicated with the prose-
cutor's office in an attempt to ascertain proper procedures. Furthermore, the prosecutor's
office alerted the police to relevant legal decisions affecting police action. Programs
also were being developed which placed prosecuting attorneys on a full-time basis at
police detective divisions in order to provide continuing legal assistance to the police
on a 24-hour basis. Cf. STANDARDs at 242-43, suggesting a full-time police legal ad-
visor, independent of the prosecutor's office to enhance his objectivity.
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and prosecutors is the same: to prevent the loss of otherwise valid
convictions. 4 '
Professor Reiss also suggests that plea bargaining is a major con-
tributor to the ineffectiveness of the exclusionary rule:
Our recent work suggests that the discretion exercised by prose-
cutors, defense lawyers, defendants, and judges in admitting only
a very small percentage of charges to trial undermines the operat-
ing foundation of the exclusionary rule. The bargain justice of
the prosecutor and the court encouraging the defendant to enter a
plea of guilt renders the normative power of the Supreme Court
ephemeral. Not only do defendants bargain away a most funda-
mental right by a plea of guilt, but the prosecutor and the courts
also effectively bargain away most of their power to hold the police
accountable for their behavior toward citizens.42
Since a plea of guilty in effect waives a defendant's constitutional
objections to a search or confession,43 the argument has at least su-
perficial appeal. But it assumes that final plea bargaining always
takes place before a hearing has been held on the merits of the con-
stitutional claim. In addition, the argument assumes that the parties
do not consider in the bargaining process the possible illegality of a
search. A defense attorney confronted by what he believes to be a
possibly illegal search or confession should be in no hurry to ad-
vise his client to plead guilty before there has been an evidentiary
hearing on the admissibility of the evidence. Relevant, of course,
is the importance of potentially excludable evidence to the prosecu-
tion's case.44  And even if the initial constitutional decision is ad-
verse to the defendant, the possibility that it may be overturned on
appeal still may influence the relative bargaining position of the
parties.
The fact that such bargaining levers may be available to a de-
fendant does not mean that some of the impact of the exclusionary
rule cannot be bargained away by a guilty plea, 45 and empirical data
41 Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Professor Reiss are not taking quite the same posi-
tion. Chief Justice Burger suggests that the exclusionary rule is inadequate because the
police and the prosecutor do not communicate. Professor Reiss, on the other hand,
apparently believes that the police and the prosecutor do not communicate, in part,
because of the exclusionary rule. Presumably, the judicial subsystem communicates
with neither. In fact, judges do communicate, formally and informally, with the prose-
cutor's office, and that information frequently may be relayed, again formally or infor-
mally, to the police. See also note 40 supra.
42 1Rmss at 218.
43 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
44 Cf. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L.
REv. 439, 447 (1971).
4 5 See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. L REv. 50,
82 (1968).
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showing the exact impact which the potentially illegally obtained
evidence has on the plea bargaining process would be quite useful.
The more precise question is, however, the extent to which the mere
existence of plea bargaining destroys the deterrent impact of the
exclusionary rule by permitting the police to assume that there will
be no real penalty for illegal conduct. The conclusion that the
police confidently violate citizen rights, secure in the knowledge that
plea bargaining will overcome the effect of the exclusionary rule, is
speculative at best.46
It should be remembered that the exclusionary rule has been at-
tacked, not only because it fails to adequately prevent police mis-
conduct, but also because society is allegedly injured by the freeing
of guilty persons.47 With plea bargaining, fewer persons who are
guilty of crime and who have also been subjected to illegal police
practices are likely to be released without some form of punishment.
if in fact the plea bargaining system leads to a compromise in which
the defendant accepts some punishment, although less than he
might expect after a full trial at which the questionable evidence is
admitted,48 the interests of society are not greatly disadvantaged.49
Generally it is hard to see how the plea bargaining system, which
on its own merits is admittedly far from faultless, can be accorded
any more than marginal blame for police misconduct.
Ultimately, Professor Reiss believes that it is the legitimization
of police intervention and reciprocal civility between police and cit-
izens, coupled with police professionalization, which will create the
improvement in police conduct which current legal rules have not
accomplished. 50 This proposition may be theoretically sound, but
its practical possibilities, at least in the near future, seem to be mini-
mal. Moreover, the potential dangers of relying on it are enormous,
46 For the argument that "the slight and rather speculative deterrent impact to be
gained by prohibiting plea bargaining in this situation would be more than offset by
the resulting strain on our system," see White supra note 44, at 461.
47 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13,
150 N.E. 585 (1926), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
4 8 See White supra note 44, at 460-62.
49 Society thus might be "harmed" more by a damage remedy requiring the payment
of substantial sums to individuals subjected to illegal police practices. Presumably, a
substantial monetary expenditure would be necessary to create a sufficient deterrent
effect. Logically, a government being forced to pay out substantial funds because of
police misconduct would put pressure on the police to limit illegal practices. In the
long run, police adherence to the constitutional rules would limit recoveries, ultimately
reducing the financial cost. In the short run, however, before the deterrent effect sets
in, it might be rather expensive.
50 RBiss at 182-85.
BOOK COMMENT
even, or perhaps especially, assuming a change in current legal rules
to more easily accommodate the theoretical model by eliminating sub-
system conflicts. While The Police and the Public does not attempt
to answer the question of how a civil society should be created, it
does attack one aspect of the problem - the present assumption
that police should be trained to accept citizen incivility. Professor
Reiss argues that:
[I]n a civil society no one should be trained or paid to accept in-
civility; to accept invectives that begin with "mother" or animal
names. That is not to say that the police cannot be disciplined
and trained to deal in a civil fashion with citizens who behave with
incivility. They must! But failure to sanction incivility toward
the police on the grounds that the police should expect, and there-
fore accept it, is to lay the ground for even less civility of citizens
toward the police and for the police to respond in kind when
opportunity presents itself.51
Initially, if the police "respond in kind," the training to accept in-
civility which they presently receive is not proving very effective.
More important, levying sanctions on citizen incivility requires the
creation and enforcement of verbal crimes directed against the po-
lice. Such legislation would raise serious questions of free speech,
and create considerable potential for harassment and arbitrary en-
forcement."2 "Civility" is an excellent societal goal - whether it
51Id. at 184-85.
52 In Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), defendant was charged with direct-
ing the following language at ar officer: "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you;" "You
son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death;" and to another officer: "You son of a bitch if
you ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all to pieces." Defendant was con-
victed under the Georgia code which provides that "any person who shall, without
provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence, opprobrious words or abusive
language, tending to cause a breach of peace . .. shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6303 (1953). The United States Supreme Court overturned
defendant's conviction, holding that because the Georgia appellate courts had failed to
limit the statute to "fighting words," see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942), the statute was overly broad in violation of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments. But cf. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
See also Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 26, 1972, at 1, col. 1:
Foul language off and on stage brought an abrupt halt to a rock concert last
night at St Edward Catholic High School, 13500 Detroit Avenue, Lakewood.
The female vocalist and male bass player of the rock band Eli Radish were
arrested and 500 rock fans were sent home early by Lakewood Police.
The fuss began during an intermission when a Lakewood policewoman
stationed in the women's restroom overheard vocalist Barbara Marek, 20,
using a four-letter word. Miss Marek was promptly arrested for disorderly
conduct.
Learning of the arrest, bass player Dan Sheridan, 21, took the microphone
to tell the audience what had happened. When he repeated the four-letter.
word that prompted the first arrest, Sheridan too, was arrested for disorderly
conduct ....
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should be sought through increased emphasis on verbal crime is
questionable.
The Police and the Public offers at least one concrete and imme-
diate suggestion in response to the problem of bureaucratic minimiza-
tion of police accountability:53
Police officers should be required to make an official record of
any work contact with a citizen when the encounter is terminated,
whether or not an arrest is made. Immediately on completion, a
copy of the form should be given to the citizen as an official notice
acknowledging the contact, and another copy should be filed with
the department. The form must be numbered uniquely, as it is
for traffic warrants, to insure greater accountability in its use.54
The suggested form would include at a minimum: the name and ad-
dress of the citizen or citizens involved; the number or name of the
policeman; the location of the contact; whether an automobile was
involved; the reason for the contact; its date, hour, and duration; a
statement of citizen rights and whether they were communicated to
the citizen; a notice telling the citizen where to register complaints;
and "any special features of the decision related either to the of-
ficer's discretion or the citizen's options, e.g., a citizen's inability to
communicate with an officer, and why, or a citizen's refusal to sign
a complaint."55
An extensive addition to the enormous amount of paper work
presently produced by a typical big city police department is certain-
ly of questionable value. Professor Reiss argues that the practice
would "cost less than school reports to parents.""6 But this is hard-
ly an acceptable justification, especially if the procedure is not ef-
ficacious. Why expect the officer who violates a citizen's rights to
fill out the form? In fact, an officer may fill out the form inaccu-
rately, creating a record supporting his own position. An officer
might fail to warn a citizen of his rights,5" fill out the form indicat-
ing that the citizen had been warned, and give the form to the
citizen, who, unsophisticated as to its meaning, or merely unsettled
by the encounter, will accept the form. Having done so, the citi-
zen may be estopped from later asserting that he in fact was never
53 See generally Rsiss at 158-202.
54 Id. at 205.
55Id. at 205-06.
56 Id. at 206.
57 Obviously the "rights" in question are not necessarily ones for which constitu-
tional warnings now are necessary. There might be some question as to precisely of
what the citizen need be warned, but that would not be a major problem, assuming the
efficacy of the procedure in general.
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given any warnings. He surely can look forward to some uncom-
fortable moments during cross-examination. Of course, in some
cases a form of the type suggested may be of some utility; it cer-
tainly would be useful to provide citizens with the telephone num-
ber for reporting complaints. But is that really worth the effort?
And more important, is this a significant improvement in correct-
ing police abuses and guaranteeing police accountability?
Professor Reiss recognizes that an argument can be made that
the form procedure will create data files which can be used against
citizens. He argues, however, that in fact nothing prevents these
files from being created independently: "The problem is how to
protect citizens from the misuse of information, not the gathering
of information lest it be misused.""' But if we affirmatively -e-
quire the police to create such files, which do not now exist, we have
greatly increased the ability to misuse the information.59
In conclusion, it should be understood that the standards govern-
ing police practices are not being defined and enforced with full
effectiveness by lawyer-created rules. If behavioral scientists can
convincingly demonstrate that a current legal approach is not moti-
vationally sound, we should give considerable thought to remaking
the rules, with both short and long-term considerations in mind.
Whether or not lawyers ultimately accept or reject the kind of sug-
gestions which The Police and the Public makes is irrelevant to the
overall goal. Although this particular book falls far short of pro-
viding final solutions, it at least reveals some potential for interac-
tion between lawyers and behavioral scientists.
PETER S. GREENBERG*
58REiss at 207.
59 Since the files will accumulate in a random manner, there will be less danger that
freedom of association and expression will be limited than where files are kept concern-
ing only certain apparently troublesome individuals or groups. See Anderson v. Sills,
56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970), upholding the state's right to maintain files of
individuals involved in demonstrations, rallys, etc., despite the potential chilling effect
on first amendment rights.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
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